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PREEMPTION OF TORT LAWSUITS: THE
REGULATORY PARADIGM IN THE ROBERTS
COURT*
Christina E. Wells"
William E. Marcantel'*
Dave Winters**

I. INTRODUCTION
Federal preemption of state tort lawsuits (especially products
liability and negligence lawsuits) has concerned the Supreme
Court in recent decades. Since 1992, the Court has decided at
least sixteen cases involving this issue.' The Roberts Court alone
has handed down six such cases 2 with the two most recent having
just been decided in the 2010 term.' The large number of cases
has spurred discussion of the Roberts Court's "keen interest in
* @ 2011, Christina E. Wells, William E. Marcantel & Dave Winters. All rights
reserved. We are indebted to Martha Dragich, Kent Gates, Ron Krotoszynski, Paul Litton,
the participants of the University of Illinois College of Law Faculty Colloquium, and the
Saint Louis University School of Law Faculty Workshop for their willingness to discuss
ideas with us and read other versions of this Article.
** Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. J.D.,
cum laude, University of Chicago School of Law, 1988; B.A., cum laude, University of Kansas, 1985.
*
J.D., University of Missouri School of Law, 2009.
**** J.D. expected 2011, University of Missouri School of Law.
1. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011), affg sub nom. Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009); Williamson v. Mazda Motor ofAm., Inc., 131 S. Ct.
1131 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-1201 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); Exxon Ship. Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Warner Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008) (mem. affirming 4-4); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552
U.S. 312 (2008); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002); Buckman Co. v. Pls.' Leg. Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001);
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S.
344 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); FreightlinerCorp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280 (1995); CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group Co., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
2. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068; Williamson, 131 S. Ct. 1131; Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187;
Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 538; Exxon Ship. Co., 554 U.S. 471; Riegel, 552 U.S. 312.
3. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068; Williamson, 131 S. Ct. 1131.

HeinOnline -- 40 Stetson L. Rev. 793 2010-2011

794

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. 40

preemption battles."' More important than the number of cases,
however, is that the Roberts Court has come to accept a particular
view of tort lawsuits in its preemption decisions-one that envisions such lawsuits not as vehicles to redress "wrongs done by
private parties to private parties" but rather as merely "arm[s] of
the public regulatory state."' This regulatory view of tort lawsuits
may eventually affect the outcome of the Court's preemption decisions.
Under the Court's preemption doctrine, federal law displaces
conflicting state law in cases of overlapping regulatory authority.'
For almost two decades, however, the Court has struggled to
define the extent to which state tort law actually conflicts with
federal law. The Court sometimes found preemption after characterizing tort lawsuits as having a primarily regulatory effect-i.e.,
it viewed tort law as merely a form of public law much like statutes or regulations.' In this regulatory paradigm, the purpose of
tort law (and tort lawsuits) was to maximize social welfare by
deterring undesirable behavior and promoting socially optimal
activity.' If tort lawsuits arguably interfered with the federal government's attempt to regulate such behavior, the Court found
preemption was appropriate. In other cases, the Court eschewed
the regulatory paradigm in favor of a compensatory paradigm
regarding tort lawsuits-i.e., it adopted a view that focused primarily on the private law characteristics of tort law.? In these
cases, the Court found against preemption because it viewed
common law tort verdicts as not having an effect on businesses
similar enough to statutes and regulations to amount to conflict4. Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 1659, 1696 (2009).
5. Alexandra Mass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1501, 1508, 1565 (2009).
6. Zellmer, supra n. 4, at 1666.
7. E.g. Riegel, 552 U.S. 312; Geier, 529 U.S. 861; CSX Transp., 507 U.S. 658; Cipol-

lone, 505 U.S. 504.
8. For a discussion of tort law as public law, see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of
Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801, 1801
(1997) (explaining deterrence theory in tort law).
9. For a discussion of tort law as private law, see Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs
373-374 (Cambridge U. Press 1992) (noting that the obligation of a wrongful injurer to
compensate a wrongfully injured victim flows from the fact of injury); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs & Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 71 (1998)
(arguing that tort law is a law of individualized wrongs in which "justice requires that a
tortfeasor restore those whom his wrongdoing has injured").
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ing legal mandates.' It further found that preemption interfered
with the purpose of compensating victims for wrongs done to
them by others.n In recent years, the Court has increasingly
trended toward the regulatory paradigm, 2 with the Roberts Court
adopting it both in cases in which it found preemption 3 and in
which it did not.14
Theoretically, the choice between a regulatory or compensatory paradigm when framing the nature of tort lawsuits should
not matter. Congressional intent to preempt state law is the supposed sine qua non of the Court's analysis, and its cases purport
to engage in careful scrutiny of that intent." How the Court views
tort lawsuits would seem to be somewhat beside the point. Nevertheless, viewing tort lawsuits as merely another form of state
regulation gives the Court great leeway to manipulate preemption. Even express preemption provisions are notoriously vague,
often noting simply that federal law displaces conflicting state
"laws," "requirements," or "standards." 6 If tort lawsuits are an
extension of regulatory law, courts more easily justify reading a
vague statutory clause as applying not only to statutes but to tort
law as well."
Similarly, if tort lawsuits are regulatory in nature, courts
quite reasonably defer to administrative officials' claims that such
lawsuits interfere with their regulatory regimes." Specific attention to whether Congress actually meant to preempt lawsuits or
to whether lawsuits serve an important nonregulatory purpose10. E.g. Bates, 544 U.S. 431; Sprietsma, 537 U.S. 51; Lohr, 518 U.S. 470; Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
11. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487 (observing that preemption would bar "most, if not all, relief
for persons injured").
12. For scholars noting this trend, see Klass, supra note 5, at 1549-1555; Catherine
Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption:An InstitutionalApproach, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
449, 460-465 (2008); The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
169, 385-386 (2005) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
13. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323-324.
14. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204.
15. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that federal
preemption must be "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress").
16. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522; see also Zellmer, supra n. 4, at 1666-1670 (discussing
the difficulty courts have in applying preemption).
17. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522 (rejecting the assertion "that the phrase 'requirement or prohibition' limits the 1969 Act's [preemptive] scope to positive enactments by
legislatures and agencies").
18. E.g. id. at 522-524.
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such as redressing private wrongs-is unnecessary. Viewing tort
lawsuits as part of the regulatory apparatus creates a shortcut
that makes those questions unnecessary. Given that the Court
has never clarified the level of deference to be applied to administrative assertions of preemption, lower courts are sure to be
confused (at the very least) regarding whether to defer to agency
officials' claims that their regulations of particular products
preempt litigants' ability to file tort lawsuits about those very
same products.
This short Article first examines the Court's general preemption doctrine, including relevant criticisms. It then details the rise
of the regulatory paradigm in the Supreme Court's cases, especially as it culminates in the Roberts Court's reliance on it.
Finally, it examines potential implications of increasing reliance
on that paradigm, including manipulation of preemption doctrine
by judges, continued deference to agency officials' decisions to
preempt, and adverse effects on individual tort plaintiffs.
II. PREEMPTION-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. The Legal Regime
Because Congress and the states have concurrent regulatory
authority in most areas,"9 numerous opportunities arise for conflict between state and federal law. The Supremacy Clause
resolves these conflicts in favor of the federal government.20
Accordingly, the Court's preemption doctrine holds that federal
law displaces conflicting state regulation, thus elevating federal
law as the source of legal authority.2 ' Preemption of state law can
serve several important goals, including providing uniform
national standards for "safety, health, or environmental protection";2 2 providing national markets that preserve economies of
19.

Fidelity Fed. Sat. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-153 (1982).

20. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
21. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 ("[Slince our decision in McCulloch v. Maryland ... it

has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect.'" (citation
omitted)).
22. Robert Verchick & Nina A. Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism,in
Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism's Core Question 18 (Wil-
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scale and coordination or distribution of products; 23 and preventing the "imposition of externalities [on regulated entities] by
unfriendly state legislation." 24
Nevertheless, preemption can upset the delicate balance of
powers between federal and state governments. Accordingly, the
Court requires that preemption be "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."25 Congress can manifest preemptive intent in
many ways. Most obviously, Congress can expressly preempt
state law by explicitly stating its intent in the text of a statute.2 6
Express preemption is not, however, required.2 7
Two general categories of implied preemption exist, usually
called field preemption and conflict preemption.28 Field preemption occurs when the federal regulatory scheme is "so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the states to supplement it"29 or when it addresses such a "dominant" interest that courts will assume federal law "preclude [s]
enforcement of state laws on the same subject." 0 In such situations, the comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme or the
nature of the issue it addresses warrants an implication of congressional intent to preempt state law.31
liam Buzbee ed., Cambridge U. Press 2008).
23. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA
L. Rev. 1353, 1369 (2006); but see Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 811, 828-829 (2008) (discussing whether national standards are better solutions
than state standards).
24. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra n. 23, at 1356; Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the
ProperFederal Role in American Tort Law, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 917, 922 (1996); but see Schapiro, supra n. 23, at 824-828 (discussing weaknesses in spillover-effects arguments).
25. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 ("[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of [preemption] analysis." (internal quotations omitted).
26. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. St. Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Commn., 461 U.S.
190, 203 (1983) ("It is well-established that within [clonstitutional limits Congress may
preempt state authority by so stating in express terms."). Express preemption requires
that Congress "include[] in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that
issue," and that provision must provide "a reliable indicium of congressional intent with
respect to state authority." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
27. Crosby v. Natl. For. Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) ("[T]he existence of
conflict cognizable under the Supremacy Clause does not depend on express congressional
recognition that federal and state law may conflict.").
28. Id. at 373.
29. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
30. Id.; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) ("Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties[,] and states, no less than the interest
of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field
affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.").
31. Rice, 331 U.S. at 232-233.
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Conflict preemption occurs either when a direct conflict
between state and federal law makes compliance with both "a
physical impossibility"3 2 or "when state law 'stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.""' The impossibility or direct prong of conflict preemption is "vanishingly narrow,"34 implicating only those
instances in which regulated entities cannot simultaneously
comply with both state and federal law.3 5 In contrast, obstacle
preemption can be very broad, extending to "all other cases in
which courts think that the effects of state law will hinder accomplishment of the purposes behind federal law."" Courts thus
imply congressional intent, assuming that Congress does not
want state laws to obstruct the operation, policies, or purposes of
federal law."
B. Preemption and the Problems of Interpretation
Although the preemption doctrine seems relatively
straightforward, its application is complicated and occasionally
incomprehensible. Despite the Court's intimation that express
preemption is straightforward, express preemption analysis
requires far more than a simple statutory reading." A court must
determine the meaning of an often imprecise preemption clause,
its preemptive scope, and the possible interaction between that

clause and a savings clause (i.e., a clause exempting areas from
32. Fla.Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963).
33.
34.
35.

FidelityFed. Say., 458 U.S. at 152 (quotingHines, 312 U.S. at 67).
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 228 (2000).
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and InstitutionalChoice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727,

739 (2008) (noting the narrow situations in which federal law trumps state law in impossibility preemption).

36. Nelson, supra n. 34, at 228-229; William Funk et al., The Truth about Torts: Using
Agency Preemption to Undercut Consumer Health and Safety 3, http://www.justice.org/cps/

rde/xbcr/justice/TruthTorts_- 704.pdf (Sept. 2007) (remarking that courts are largely
responsible for determining whether conflict preemption exists).
37. Funk et al., supra n. 36, at 3-4.
38. See e.g. CSX Transp., 507 U.S. at 664 (explaining that "[ilfthe statute contains an
express [preemption] clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance
focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains best evidence of Congress' [preemptive] intent"); English v. General Electr. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)

("[Preemption] fundamentally is a question of congressional intent. .. and when Congress
has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy
one.").
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preemption)." All of these tasks are fraught with ambiguity, making express preemption more complicated than on first glance.4 0
Implied (usually obstacle) preemption raises additional problems.
Without an explicit preemptive clause, the notion that courts rely
on congressional intent to preempt is misguided at best.4 1 Judges
have enormous discretion to determine the existence of such
intent and the extent to which federal law displaces state law.42
Commentators have thus criticized the Court's express and
implied preemption standards as allowing too much federal
preemption. Some argue that the Court's preemption standards
allow judicial manipulation of the issues that actually drive the
preemption doctrine.4 3 For others, the Court's preemption doctrine undermines the political safeguards of federalism built into
the Constitution.4 4 Accordingly, the benefits of regulation at the
state and local level-which include increased government
accountability,4 5 the diffusion of power associated with divided
39. See Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 559, 566 (1997) (noting that the Court uses "standard methods
of statutory construction," including determining for the plain meaning of language, considering statutory context, and reviewing legislative history); see also S. Candice Hoke,
Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 700 (1991)
(observing that "the Court tends to employ standard statutory construction techniques"
with express preemption).
40. Donald P. Rothschild, A Proposed "Tonic" with Florida Lime to Celebrate Our New
Federalism: How to Deal with the "Headache"of Preemption, 38 U. Miami L. Rev. 829,
843-844 (1984) ("The doctrine of express preemption is easily stated. Its application, however, is far more problematic.. .. The problem of ascertaining congressional intent is not
limited to poorly phrased preemption clauses. Even unambiguous statements of statutory
intent require analysis to determine the scope of the preemption clause.").
41. Merrill, supra n. 35, at 740 ("(I]t is somewhat anomalous to say that legislative
intent or purpose is the 'touchstone' of a doctrine in which implied preemption plays such a
large role.").
42. Rothschild, supra n. 40, at 854.
43. See e.g. Hoke, supra n. 39, at 716-717 (discussing how the "pliant standards"
governing preemption allow "judicial policymaking"); Rothchild, supra n. 40, at 854 ("The
second inherent weakness in the 'frustration of purpose' doctrine is that the consideration
of whether a statute's purpose will be frustrated encourages courts to proceed in a more
hypothetical, abstract fashion. If a court is antagonistic to the state's legislation, it will
usually hypothesize situations that produce a conflict between the state and federal legislation.").
44. Grey, supra n. 39, at 565; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96
Mich. L. Rev. 813, 817-818 (1998); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism:The Missing
Link, 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 69, 88 (1988).
45. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2007); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption againstAgency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695, 710 (2008).
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government,"6 enhanced government engagement with citizens,47
and greater experimentation with regulatory solutions 4 8-are lost
when federal law preempts state law.
The Court's "presumption against preemption" ostensibly
exists to avoid these criticisms by assuming that "the historic
police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [federal
law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."4 9 The Court uses the presumption both to interpret
express preemption clauses narrowlyso and to guide its implied
preemption analysis." Numerous commentators, however, note
that the Court's reliance on the presumption is haphazard and
inconsistent.52 Others argue that the presumption is too weak to
make much difference to courts" or is actually a presumption in
favor of preemption.5 4 Accordingly, the Court's attempt to rein in
the potentially expansive application of its doctrine through the
presumption against preemption has yielded few results.
Agencies' role in preemption determinations further complicates matters. While agencies can preempt state law,55 the precise
contours of this power are unclear. Agencies may issue preemptive rules if Congress expressly delegates preemptive power to
them." More controversially, an agency may also issue preemp46. Mendelson, supran. 45, at 710.
47. Verchick & Mendelson, supra n. 22, at 4.
48. Id. at 4-5; Schapiro, supra n. 23, at 820-821.
49. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
50. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
51. Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 543; CSX Transp., 507 U.S. at 673 n. 12. Ironically, the presumption is not used much in cases of implied preemption. Sharkey, supra n.
12, at 458 n. 34.
52. See e.g. Grey, supra n. 39, at 560 ("The Court has vacillated in its approach in the
area, shifting from presumptions for to presumptions against preemption, most recently
changing its course within the span of a few decisions."); Sharkey, supra n. 12, at 458
(discussing "the Court's haphazard application of the presumption" against preemption in
products liability cases within the span of a few decisions).
53. Merrill, supra n. 35, at 742 ("The doctrine also exaggerates the judicial reluctance
to displace state law. While continuing to invoke the presumption against preemption,
federal courts apply preemption more than any other constitutional doctrine.").
54. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L.

Rev. 967, 971 (2002).

55. E.g. N.Y v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988); Hillsborough Co. v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Fidelity Fed. Sav., 458 U.S. at 141; United States v.

Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
56. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-373 (1989). Congress can delegate
legislative authority to agencies if it provides intelligible principles for them to follow. Id.
Congress occasionally explicitly grants agencies the discretion to preempt state law. See
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tive regulations pursuant to valid exercises of generally delegated
administrative power." Absent explicit delegation of preemptive
authority, it makes sense to imply such authority in agencies
when state law directly conflicts with agency regulations." But
problems arise when an agency asserts that its rules preempt
state law because that law poses an obstacle to accomplishment of
federal goals." Without an expression of congressional intent or a
direct conflict with agency rules, judges find it especially difficult
to assess whether preemption of state law is warranted.o Furthermore, because the agency is an interested party, problems of
agency bias can arise."
Similar problems arise when an agency interprets a vague
62
statutory preemption clause in order to determine its scope or
when an agency interprets a statute as having preemptive effect
6
although it does not otherwise mention preemption. 3 Such
instances involve the Court in two conflicting doctrines-the
search for congressional intent that is at the heart of preemption
analysis and the Court's deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous laws under Chevron v. National Resources Defense

Council.'

Unfortunately, the Court has never adequately

e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2006) (preempting flammability standards and regulations for
fabric); 30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (2006) (preempting state laws that "are in effect to regulate
surface mining and reclamation operations).; see also Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative
Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1429, 1429-1430

(1984) (discussing statutes delegating preemptive authority).
57. N.Y., 486 U.S. at 63-64 ("[A] federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may [preempt] state regulation." (quoting La. Pub. Serv.
Commn. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-369 (1986))).
58. Mendelson, supra n. 45, at 700 ("[Ilt is reasonable to assume that Congress would
want a properly authorized agency action to be effective, and thus to trump directly conflicting state law.").
59. See id. at 701-704 (describing recent agency assertions of obstacle preemption).
60. Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 869, 895-896 (2008).
61. Foote, supra n. 56, at 1441 ("The agency is an interested party, not an independent
arbiter. This conflict of interest . . . exacerbates the federal bias inherent in the agency's
non-representative character.").
62. See e.g. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 743-744 (1996) (discussing the agency's
interpretation of the term "interest" in an ambiguous statute and whether that affected
the preemptive scope of the statute).
63. See e.g. Geier, 529 U.S. at 874-875 (holding that a narrow reading of the statute
avoided the agency's conclusion that state common law interfered with the goals of the
federal statute and was impliedly preempted).
64. 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (deciding that courts must defer to agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutes if the agency interpretation is reasonable).

HeinOnline -- 40 Stetson L. Rev. 801 2010-2011

802

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. 40

explained which of the two approaches prevails." Critics have
noted that judicial deference to agency interpretations that federal law preempts state law may result in preemption in
instances in which Congress never anticipated it."
III. THE SUPREME COURT, PREEMPTION,AND
STATE TORT LAWSUITS
The introduction of tort lawsuits exacerbates problems with
the Court's preemption doctrine. The Court ostensibly utilizes its
traditional preemption tools when state tort law is involved, looking to statutory language with express preemption or attempting
to divine congressional intent with implied preemption. But tort
law does not fit easily within this framework. Positive enactments, such as statutes or regulations, involve general and
prospective rules establishing standards of conduct.6 ' When
preemption involves positive enactments at both the federal and
state levels, the primary question is whether a conflict exists
between their mandates such that federal law should triumph.
But when the preemption question involves a potential conflict
between federal statutes or regulations, on the one hand, and
state tort law, on the other, an additional question arises-i.e.,
whether tort law damages verdicts establish a mandate at all.
Given that tort law derives from adjudications involving individuals in retrospective and personal dispute-resolution
processes, 9 tort law is arguably an altogether different creature
65. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (declaring that the weight accorded an "agency's explanation of state law's impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency,
and persuasiveness" when Congress has not expressly granted preemptive authority to the
agency); Geier, 529 U.S. at 883-884 (placing "some weight" on the Department of Transportation's interpretation of agency safety standards); Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744 (assuming
de novo review applied to preemption, but applying Chevron deference to an agency interpretation of a statute, arguably broadening the statute's preemptive scope); see also
Mendelson, supra n. 45, at 715-717 (commenting on the Court's conflicting approaches).
66. Mendelson, supra n. 45, at 714; Merrill, supra n. 35, at 740; Funk et al., supra n.
36, at 9.
67. See Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 239 (discussing the types of preemption the Supreme
Court has recognized).
68. For a comparison of rules and adjudications, see Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. St. Bd. of

Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
69. See generally Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective

Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 941, 952-953 (1995) (noting how "[rietrospective decisions act upon the basis of past circumstances or conduct").

HeinOnline -- 40 Stetson L. Rev. 802 2010-2011

2011]

Preemption of Tort Lawsuits

803

from statutory and regulatory law. Much of the purpose of tort
law (and tort lawsuits) is to right private wrongs and to provide
redress in particularized and concrete disputes.o Furthermore,
unlike positive enactments, a negligence or products liability verdict leaves a defendant with a choice between compliance and
absorbing damages as a cost of doing business." Thus, it is not
clearly a primary goal of tort law to establish legal or regulatory
standards in the same manner as statutes or agency regulations.
On the other hand, potential defendants surely do not ignore the
possibility of large damage awards and may accordingly change
their behavior as a result of such awards. Thus, tort damage
awards can exert a regulatory effect (i.e., deterrence or promotion
of certain behaviors) 7 2 similar to statutory and regulatory law.
The Court's preemption cases have acknowledged both the
regulatory and compensatory aspects of lawsuits." Originally, its
choice of one view over the other paralleled its decision to
preempt state tort lawsuits.7 4 In recent years, especially in the
Roberts Court, the regulatory aspect of tort damages has come to
dominate the Court's vision, even in those cases in which the
Court does not find preemption."
A. Foundational Cases and the Aftermath
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon," the Court
famously noted the regulatory nature of tort lawsuits in the
preemption context:
[State] regulation can be . . . effectively exerted through an
award of damages .... The obligation to pay compensation

can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. Even the States' salutary
effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for
past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are
70. See supra n. 9 (discussing private law aspects of tort law).
71. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 536-537 (Blackmun, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
72. See supra n. 8 (discussing public law aspects of tort law).
73. E.g. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
74. E.g. id. at 521-522.
75. E.g. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201; Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 545; Exxon Ship.
Co., 554 U.S. at 486-487; Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
76. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory
scheme.
Garmon, however, did not deny the individual the compensatory
aspect of tort lawsuits; rather, it simply noted that the regulatory
effects overshadowed compensatory aspects, thus requiring
preemption. 8
The Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp." took a similar

approach when it held federal law did not preempt a punitivedamages award for injuries suffered by a laboratory analyst who
was exposed to plutonium while employed at a nuclear facility.o
Despite federal occupation of the field regarding most of nuclear
safety, the Court found no indication that Congress intended the
federal government to preempt state tort remedies for radiationrelated injuries." Congress' silence on that issue "[took] on added
significance in light of [its] failure to provide any federal remedy
for persons injured by such conduct," and the Court found it "difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove
all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."82 Like Garmon, however, Silkwood recognized that damage
awards could exert a "regulatory" effect because they might coerce
nuclear plants to "conform to state standards."8 3 Congress nevertheless tolerated that regulatory consequence in that case.8 4
77. Id. at 247.
78. Id. (noting incidents in which the Court did not find the federal interest in
preemption sufficient to overcome the state interest in compensation for tortious wrongdoing in the labor-regulation field).

79. 464 U.S. 238.
80. Id. at 258. Karen Silkwood's father brought the lawsuit after she was killed in a
car accident, suing under Oklahoma common law for personal injury and property damage.
Id. at 242-243. The case was submitted to the jury under negligence and strict liability
theories. Id. at 244. The jury awarded $505,000 in compensatory and $10 million in punitive damages. Id. at 245. The Tenth Circuit reversed the compensatory damages award for
personal injury because Silkwood's injuries were covered exclusively by workers compensation law, but the court upheld the property-damage award. Id. The Tenth Circuit also
reversed the punitive-damages award, finding the award was preempted by federal law.
Id. at 246.
81. Id. at 251.

82. Id. (citing United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-

664 (1954)).
83. Id. at 256.
84. Id. Furthermore, the Court found the regulatory effect of punitive damages too
weak to pose an actual conflict with, or an obstacle to, the accomplishment of federal goals.

Id.
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Less than a decade later, these parallel visions of tort law
were at the center of the Court's disagreement in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.8 1 Cipollone involved a smoker with lung cancer who sued cigarette manufacturers alleging various common
law violations, including design defect, negligence, failure to
warn, breach of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation,
and conspiracy to defraud." The Court agreed with the manufacturers' argument that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 (1969 Act)," which governed warning labels on cigarette
packages, preempted her claims. 8
Section 5(b) of the 1969 Act barred state law from imposing
any "requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ...
with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes"
labeled in a manner consistent with federal law. 9 Citing to Garmon, the plurality opinion argued that "[tihe phrase 'no
requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the
contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the
form of [common law] rules."" The opinion further noted that "the
essence of the common law [is] to enforce duties that are either
affirmative requirements or negative prohibitions."" It thus

rejected Cipollone's "argument that the phrase 'requirement or
prohibition' limits the 1969 Act's [preemptive] scope to positive
enactments by legislatures and agencies."9 2 Accordingly, the regulatory effect of those claims, coupled with broad terms like
"requirement or prohibition," led the Court to find preemption for
Cipollone's common law claims related to the cigarette company's
failure to warn."
85. 505 U.S. 504.
86. Id. at 509-510. Rose Cipollone's son maintained the original action after her death.
Id. at 509.
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2006).
88.

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-526.

89. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
90. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247).
91. Id. at 522 (emphasis in original). The Court also referred to the plain language of
the 1969 Act, which simply said "law" rather than "statute or regulation," suggesting that

Congress wanted to reach beyond positive law. Id. at 522-523. In contrast, the Court
declined to find that that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965
preempted Cipollone's claims because of the absence of expressly preemptive language
regarding common law actions. Id. at 518-520.
92. Id. at 522.
93. Id. at 524.
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Three Justices dissented in Cipollone, arguing that "[tihe
principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that
underlie the Court's reluctance to find [preemption] where Congress has not spoken directly to the issue apply with equal force
where Congress has spoken, though ambiguously."9 4 The phrase
"requirement or prohibition," they concluded, did not clearly evidence an intent to preempt common law tort claims of any kind."
They also rejected the notion that common law damage awards
exerted a regulatory effect akin to positive enactments:
The effect of tort law on a manufacturer's behavior is necessarily indirect. Although an award of damages by its very
nature attaches additional consequences to the manufacturer's continued unlawful conduct, no particular course of
action ... is required. A manufacturer found liable on . . . a
failure-to-warn claim may . . . decide to accept damages

awards as a cost of doing business and not alter its behavior
in any way .... Or, by contrast, it may choose to avoid
future awards by dispensing warnings through a variety of
alternative mechanisms.

. .

. The level of choice that a defen-

dant retains in shaping its own behavior distinguishes the
indirect regulatory effect of the common law from positive
enactments such as statutes and administrative regulations.
Moreover, tort law has an entirely separate functioncompensating victims-that sets it apart from direct forms
of regulation.96
Citing to Silkwood, the dissenters scolded the plurality for ignoring recent decisions in which the Court had "declined ...

to find

the regulatory effects of state tort law direct or substantial
enough to warrant [preemption].""
Commentators and the Court have noted that Cipollone
"unleashed a torrent of preemption litigation."" Its effect on the
94. Id. at 533 (Blackmun, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
95. Id. at 535 (noting that the statute was "far from unambiguous and cannot be said
clearly to evidence a congressional mandate to [preempt] state [common law] damages
actions").
96. Id. at 536-537 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 537-538.
98.

E.g. David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 95,

106 (2005); see also Bates, 544 U.S. at 441 (asserting that after Cipollone, a "groundswell of
federal and state decisions emerged" that held tort claims preempted).
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Court's use of the regulatory paradigm is less clear. Unlike Garmon and Silkwood, Cipollone seemingly accepted a bifurcated
view of tort lawsuits." Rather than viewing tort lawsuits as having a parallel regulatory/compensatory effect, the Cipollone
plurality chose one view and advocated strongly for it."oo
Accordingly, after Cipollone the Court relied on the regulatory paradigm to find that express preemptive provisions barring
conflicting state "laws," "rules," or "standards" extended to, and
preempted, state tort lawsuits."o' Although such clauses did not
mention tort claims directly, the Court interpreted their language
to extend to lawsuits because of their regulatory effect.' 0 2 Even in
cases in which statutes seemed expressly to preserve a litigant's
ability to bring tort lawsuits with savings clauses, the Court occasionally relied on the regulatory nature of such lawsuits to find
that the statutory scheme impliedly preempted them anyway. 0 s
In contrast, when the Court found preemption unwarranted,
it invoked the compensatory paradigm, finding that statutory
terms generally preempting conflicting state "requirements" or
"standards" did not indicate a congressional intent to preempt
lawsuits in particular. Thus, the Court in Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr'0 4 rejected an argument that the statutory term "require-

99. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (noting that common law actions often serve an
effective regulatory function).
100. Id. Later courts similarly tended to choose one view or the other to determine the
appropriateness of preemption. See infra nn. 101-106 and accompanying text (discussing
cases in which the Court adopted either the regulatory paradigm or the compensatory
paradigm).
101. See e.g. CSX Transp., 507 U.S. at 663-664 (relying on Cipollone to find that
"[1]egal duties imposed on railroads by the common law fall within the scope of these broad
phrases").
102. See id. at 675 (noting that the "common law of negligence provides a general rule
to address all hazards" and that attempts to exempt it from the preemption clause would
interfere with the government's ability to regulate). The CSX Transportation Court held
that preemption applied only to the negligence/excessive speed claims. Id. at 676.
103. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 867 (finding that a state tort lawsuit was impliedly
preempted by a federal statute prohibiting states from imposing "safety standards" that
were "not identical to the [flederal standard"); id. at 881 (noting that a "rule of state tort
law" imposing a duty to install an airbag posed an obstacle to the federal government's
regulatory goals of providing auto manufacturers with flexibility in providing passive
restraints); see also Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347 (finding fraud-on-the-agency claims
impliedly preempted by the Medical Devices Act because "[plolicing fraud against federal
agencies is hardly 'a field [that] the [states have traditionally occupied'" (quoting Rice, 331
U.S. at 230)).
104. 518 U.S. 470.
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ment" applied to common law tort claims involving medical
devices, noting that
if Congress intended to preclude all [common law] causes of
action, it chose a singularly odd word with which to do it....
[Such a] sweeping interpretation of the statute would
require .. . interference with state legal remedies, producing
a serious intrusion into state sovereignty while simultaneously wiping out the possibility of remedy for the Lohrs'
alleged injuries. 05
Other decisions have similarly followed suit. 106 Interestingly,
those cases rejecting preemption also began to highlight not
simply the personal redress aspect of tort lawsuits but other
aspects as well. Lohr, for example, noted not only that legal
remedies would be wiped out, but also that preemption was a
serious intrusion into state sovereignty,107 an independent reason
for avoiding preemption (and an unsurprising one given the federalism arguments often raised against preemption). By the time of
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C.os in 2005, however, the Court
relied not only on the compensatory nature of lawsuits to reject
preemption, but also on their value to federal regulatory schemes;
in fact, the regulatory aspects came to dominate the case.'s
Bates involved claims against a pesticide manufacturer.1 10
The Court held that a federal law prohibiting state "labeling and
packaging requirements . . . 'in addition to or different from.' fed-

eral law did not necessarily preempt lawsuits for negligence,
strict liability, fraud, and breach of warranty by farmers whose
crops were damaged after they used a pesticide in accordance
with the label's instructions."' The Court noted that "[an occur105. Id. at 487-489.
106. Bates, 544 U.S. at 449 (expressing concern that preemption would "deprive injured
parties of a long available form of compensation"); Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 64 (finding that
the Federal Boating and Safety Act did not preempt a negligence claim in light of a savings
clause and the common law's "important remedial role in compensating accident victims").
107. Supra n. 105 and accompanying text.
108. 544 U.S. 431.
109. Id. at 447-449.
110. Id. at 434.
111. Id. at 447 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006)). Dow sold the
pesticide, the label for which stated, 'Use of Strongarm is recommended in all areas where
peanuts are grown." Id. at 435. Farmers who used the pesticide in compliance with the
label experienced damaged peanut crops and sued for negligence, strict liability, fraud, and
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rence that merely motivates an optimal decision does not qualify
as a requirement."11 2 Accordingly, the lower court was wrong to
equate any jury verdict that "might 'induce"' certain behavior,
with the statutory term "requirement."'13 On the other hand, the
Court opined, that term "reaches beyond positive enactments,
such as statutes and regulations, to embrace [common law]
duties."1 14 The Bates Court saw its task as determining whether
the common law verdicts on particular issues-e.g., negligence
and fraud-were "requirements" that actually conflicted with the
statutory preemption clause pertaining to labeling.11 s In effect,
the Court applied the regulatory paradigm, noting that damages
verdicts based on certain common law duties could have the same
effect as conflicting positive enactments depending on the scope of
the common law duty.116
Only after this discussion did the Court express its distaste
for preemption that would "deprive injured parties of a long
available form of compensation."1 This was especially true in
light of the "long history of tort litigation against manufacturers
of poisonous substances."" Even here, the Court relied heavily on
the regulatory advantages of tort lawsuits:
[TIort suits can serve as a catalyst in [the agency decisionmaking] process: "By encouraging plaintiffs to bring suit for
injuries not previously recognized as traceable to pesticides
...

a state tort action ...

may aid in the exposure of new

dangers associated with pesticides. Successful actions of this
sort may lead manufacturers to petition EPA to allow more
breach of warranty. Id. at 435-436.
112. Id. at 443.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 443-445.
116. Id. at 444. Ultimately, the Court found that whether the federal statute preempted
common law depended on whether the requirements of both overlapped (i.e., whether the
common law and the statute were both aimed at packaging and labeling requirements)
and whether the common law requirements were different from those imposed by the
statute. Id. The Court found that petitioners' defective design, negligence, and breach of
warranty claims were not packaging and labeling requirements. Id. Petitioners' fraud and
failure-to-warn claims were such requirements, but the Court remanded to the lower court
for a determination as to whether they were "in addition to or different from" federal law.
Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). For further discussion, consult Sharkey, supranote 12, at
469-471.

117. Bates, 544 U.S. at 449.
118. Id.
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detailed labeling of their products; alternatively, EPA itself
may decide that revised labels are required in light of the
new information that has been brought to its attention
through common law suits. In addition, the specter of damage actions may provide manufacturers with added dynamic
incentives to continue to keep abreast of all possible injuries
stemming from use of their product so as to forestall such
actions through product improvement." 1 9
Accordingly, although Bates acknowledged the compensatory
aspects of tort lawsuits, the Court viewed these as secondary to
the regulatory paradigm that otherwise dominated the case.' 20 At
least one commentator has thus deemed Bates as cementing "the

Cipollone principle of treating state tort and statutory law
alike."' 2
B. The Roberts Court
The Roberts Court has continued to elevate the regulatory
function of tort law over its compensatory function. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 2 2 most obviously reflects the culmination of tort law
as an arm of regulation.123 Riegel involved the same preemption
provision in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)124 pertaining to FDA-approved medical devices as in Lohr.12 ' The issue in
Riegel, however, involved preemption of common law claims arising from failure of a medical device that had gone through a
different, and more stringent, approval process.' 2 6 In finding the
petitioners' common law claims preempted, Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, cited to the usual Cipollone language regarding the
regulatory effect of tort damages.12' Beyond that equation, how119. Id. at 451 (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-1542 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)).

120. Id. at 449-450.
121. Leading Cases, supra n. 12, at 376; see also Klass, supra n. 5, at 1555 (noting the
increasing trend of equating state tort law with positive enactments).

122. 552 U.S. 312.
123.

Id. at 329.

124. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399(d) (2006).
125. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322.
126.
127.

Id. at 322-323.
Id. at 324 ("As the plurality opinion said in Cipollone, [common law] liability is

'premised on the existence of a legal duty,' and a tort judgment therefore establishes that
the defendant has violated a [state law] obligation.... [A] liability award 'can be, indeed
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ever, he intimated that tort damages should be more subject to
preemption than positive law:
State tort law that requires a manufacturer's catheters to be
safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has
approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect. Indeed, one would think that
tort law, applied by juries under a negligence or strictliability standard, is less deserving of preservation. A state

statute, or a regulation adopted by a state agency, could at
least be expected to apply cost-benefit analysis similar to
that applied by the experts at the FDA: How many more
lives will be saved by a device [that], along with its greater
effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm? A jury, on the
other hand, sees only the cost of a more dangerous design,
and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who
reaped those benefits are not represented in court.128
Riegel lacks any sense that tort lawsuits serve an individual compensatory function worth preserving; rather, tort lawsuits are
subject to preemption simply because they regulate less effectively than positive enactments. 2 9
Wyeth v. Levinesoalso follows this pattern although it found
against preemption of state tort law.13 ' In Wyeth, the Court
addressed whether the FDCA preempted a tort lawsuit based
upon the manufacturer's failure to warn of possible catastrophic
consequences of drug misadministration. 3 2 Because the FDCA
contains no express preemption clause, Wyeth, the drug's manufacturer, argued the lawsuits were preempted under both
impossibility and obstacle-preemption theories.' Although the
Court rejected Wyeth's arguments,'3 4 it described the tort system
as acting "as a complementary form of drug regulation" in which
"[s]tate tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide
is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.'" (quoting

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521)).
128.
129.
on the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
See id. (analyzing preemption by considering the potential effect of state tort suits
FDA's regulatory standards).
129 S. Ct. 1187.
Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1190-1191.
Id. at 1193-1194.
Id. at 1204.
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incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks
promptly.""a' As in Bates, the Court acknowledged the compensatory nature of state tort law, but it did so not because lawsuits
redress individual wrongs.' 36 Rather such suits were valuable
because compensation "may motivate injured persons to come
forward with information.""' Accordingly, even though preemption was unwarranted, this was so because of the beneficial and
nonconflicting regulatory aspects of state tort law-not because
such law has a particularly important individual redress func-

tion.13 8

Two additional cases have less obvious paradigm choices,
although one can see hints of each paradigm in the Court's decisions. In Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,"9 the Court again considered
whether the 1969 Act involved in Cipollone preempted a state law
claim.140 Specifically, the Altria respondents claimed that the company violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA),14 '
which banned the use of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce."14 2 They asserted that
Altria's representations of light cigarettes as posing fewer health
risks, coupled with its fraudulent concealment of information
regarding smoking patterns pertaining to light cigarettes,
violated MUTPA.14 ' Relying entirely on its reasoning in Cipollone,
the Court held in a five-to-four opinion that the 1969 Act did not
preempt the MUTPA claims." Accordingly, the Court reiterated
that to establish whether a specific common law claim is
135. Id. at 1202.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 1202-1203 (noting that state tort actions provide "an additional, and
important, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA regulation[s]"). The dissent also treated state tort law as merely an arm of regulation, focusing on "the effects of
state tort suits on the federal regulatory regime," and on whether the FDA or a state jury
is better equipped to perform "cost-benefit-balancing." Id. at 1229 (Alito, J., Roberts, C.J. &
Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. 129 S. Ct. 538.
140. Id. at 542.
141. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §# 205-A to 214 (2011).
142. Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 541 n. 1.
143. Id. at 541. The petitioners asserted that Altria knowingly withheld information
that indicated that smokers engaged in compensatory behaviors, such as breathing in
larger amounts of smoke and holding the smoke in their lungs longer, which negated the
effects of the reduced tar and nicotine. Id. at 541-542.
144. Id. at 551.
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preempted, the appropriate inquiry involves "whether the legal
duty that is the predicate of the [common law] damages action
constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health ... with respect to ...

advertising or promotion,' giving

that clause a fair but narrow reading."' 45
The Altria majority found that MUTPA did not regulate
smoking and health, but rather was based on a general common
law duty not to deceive; thus, MUTPA was not subject to preemption.14 6 The majority's acceptance of Cipollone-a decision that
openly embraced the regulatory paradigm-suggests (if only
weakly) continuing adherence to the notion that lawsuits are
primarily regulatory in nature for preemption purposes. This
conclusion is somewhat strengthened by the utter absence of discussion concerning the need to compensate injured plaintiffs in a
decision that ruled against preemption. Furthermore, the four
dissenting Justices clearly adhered to the regulatory paradigm in
their criticism that the majority's decision would "have the perverse effect of increasing the nonuniformity of state regulation of
cigarette advertising."147
In contrast, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,'4 8 which involved
litigation over the 1989 crash of the Exxon Valdez, briefly invoked
the compensatory paradigm. The lower courts had awarded compensatory damages (to which Exxon stipulated liability) and five
billion dollars in punitive damages.1 49 Exxon claimed that the
Clean Water Act (CWA),so which created a comprehensive
scheme of monetary penalties for discharge of unauthorized pollutants into waterways, preempted awards of punitive damages.' 5 '
Relying on Silkwood, the Court quickly dismissed Exxon's argument, noting that its reasoning would effectively apply to many
forms of compensatory damages as well, and would "eliminate sub
silentio oil companies' common law duties to refrain from injuring
the bodies and livelihoods of private individuals."'5 2 Because there
was "no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the
145.

Id. at 545 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524) (omissions in original).

146. Id. at 551.
147.

Id. at 563 (Thomas, J., Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Alito, JJ., dissenting).

148. 554 U.S. 471.
149. Id. at 479-481.
150. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
151. Exxon Ship. Co., 554 U.S. at 488.

152. Id. at 488-489.
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entire field of pollution remedies" and allowing punitive damages
would have no "frustrating effect on the CWA remedial scheme,"
preemption was unwarranted.' Although Exxon runs somewhat
against the current infatuation with the regulatory paradigm, its
reliance on the compensatory paradigm is hardly surprising given
the lack of an explicit preemption clause and the breadth of the
possible preemption.'54
The Court's most recent cases, however, clearly appear to
embrace the regulatory paradigm. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of

America, Inc.' involved the question of whether a federal motorvehicle regulation giving manufacturers an option to install two
or three point rear seat belts preempted state law wrongful-death
actions.'s Interestingly, leading up to the decision, many actors
explicitly embraced the regulatory paradigm, even when arguing
against preemption. The petitioners' brief, for example, never
mentioned the need for individual compensation or redress;
rather, in arguing against preemption of their common law
claims, petitioners noted that tort lawsuits complemented federal
regulatory requirements and that tort claims promote the federal
regulatory goal of "technological innovation."' 7 Similarly, the
United States Solicitor General's amicus brief cast its argument
against preemption primarily in terms of the regulatory paradigm-noting that petitioners' tort claims did not interfere with
the regulatory scheme.'
Unlike the lower court, which had relied on an earlier Court
decision to find preemption,"' the Supreme Court found that the
wrongful-death lawsuits did not conflict with the federal regulatory objective of auto safety. According to the Court, the option to
provide two or three point rear seat belts was a federal safetyminimum standard, which did not bar "[sitates from imposing
153. Id. at 489.
154. See id. (noting that Exxon's position, if fully adhered to, would be overly broad).
155. 131 S. Ct. 1131.
156. Id. at 1134.
157. Br. for Petrs., Williamson v. Mazda Motor ofAm., Inc., 2010 WL 3017750 at **41,
49 (No. 08-1314, 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2010)).
158. Amicus Curiae Br. for the United States in Support of Petrs., Williamson v. Mazda
Motor ofAm., Inc., 2010 WL 4150188 at **10-14 (No. 08-1314, 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2010)).
159. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (2008). The California court relied on Geier to find that the wrongful-death lawsuit was preempted. Id. at
551-556.

HeinOnline -- 40 Stetson L. Rev. 814 2010-2011

2011]

Preemption of Tort Lawsuits

815

stricter standards.""o It further noted that "state tort law does
not conflict with a federal 'minimum standard' merely because
state law imposes a more stringent requirement.""'1 Accordingly,
although the Court ruled against preemption, it took a decidedly
regulatory view of the role that tort lawsuits play in the preemption context.
The Court in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC16 2 also embraced the
regulatory paradigm although it acknowledged the compensatory
aspects of tort lawsuits. Bruesewitz involved the question of
whether the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.6 . (Vaccine
Act) preempted state law negligence and strict-liability claims
stemming from a vaccine's administration to a child who subsequently experienced severe side effects."* The Vaccine Act
established a special vaccine court and victim compensation program to handle such claims.' 5 After the child's claim in the
vaccine court was dismissed, her parents filed a lawsuit alleging
common law design-defect claims.'6 6
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that the Vaccine Act preempted the petitioners' claim."' Given that the
federal statutory scheme was designed as an alternative-redress
system,' one might have expected the opinion to mention the
private-redress aspects of lawsuits. After all, the Vaccine Act is
precisely the kind of alternative-compensation system previous
Courts had lamented as missing when invoking the compensatory
paradigm to deny preemption. Thus, even while ruling in favor of
preemption, Justice Scalia had ample reason to discuss the com160. Williamson, 131 S. Ct. at 1139.
161. Id. (citations omitted).
162. 131 S. Ct. 1068.
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (2006).

164. 131 S. Ct. at 1072.
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11, 300aa-13. The Act entitles a person to compensation if he or
she received a vaccine covered by the Vaccine Act, suffered an injury listed in the Act's
"Table," and a preponderance of the evidence does not show that the injury was caused by
factors unrelated to the vaccine. Id.
166. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1075. The child's injuries were originally listed as "Table"

injuries but had been deleted from the Act's Injury Table prior to her petition in the vaccine court. Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 237 n. 5.
167. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1082.

168. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(e). The Vaccine Act's legislative history notes that the statute
created "a new system for compensating individuals who have been injured by vaccines
routinely administered to children." H.R. Rpt. 99-908 at 3 (Sept. 26, 1986) (reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344).
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pensatory paradigm. Other than a brief acknowledgement that
compensation was one goal of the Vaccine Act and that lack of
alternative-compensation schemes had previously been noted by
past Courts,"' however, Justice Scalia's opinion tended more
toward the regulatory paradigm. Accordingly, he noted that both
state tort law and the Vaccine Act aimed to "prompt[ ] the development of improved [vaccine] designs"' 70-a decidedly regulatory
goal. Imposition of tort liability, Scalia also noted, impeded that
goal by driving manufacturers away and threatening available
vaccines,171 much as state positive enactments might impose
unreasonable burdens on manufacturers counter to the public
good.
Justice Breyer echoed Justice Scalia's concerns1 72 and further
channeled his reasoning in Levine. Accordingly, Justice Breyer
argued that the preemption of petitioners' design-defect claims
was appropriate because determinations best made by experts
should not be second-guessed by juries.173 As in Levine, there is
little sense that Justice Breyer viewed tort lawsuits as having an
important compensatory function; rather, he is concerned solely
with the extent to which they exert an unreasonable deterrent
effect on otherwise socially important behavior of vaccine manufacturers. Even the dissenting justices, who recognized the unique
private law attributes of tort lawsuits, frequently referred to their
regulatory benefits, noting, for example, that such lawsuits help
promote socially optimal vaccine designs.174
IV. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
REGULATORY PARADIGM
The regulatory paradigm is likely to remain a prominent
aspect of the Roberts Court's jurisprudence. That reliance will
have a further trickle-down effect. Increasingly, parties embrace
the regulatory paradigm whether arguing for or against preemption,7 7 effectively relegating the compensatory paradigm to an
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1072-1074.
Id. at 1079.
Id.
Id. at 1084-1085 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1097-1099 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
See e.g. Br. for Petrs., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 2010 WL 2130598 at *53 (No. 09-

HeinOnline -- 40 Stetson L. Rev. 816 2010-2011

20111

Preemption of Tort Lawsuits

817

afterthought unless it is unavoidably implicated by schemes such
as the Vaccine Act. Lower courts also appear to rely on the regulatory paradigm regardless of the outcome of the case. 17' Even
critics of the Court's preemption decisions embrace the regulatory
paradigm on some level. For example, those critics arguing that
the Court's decisions ignore important federalism concerns tend
to embrace the regulatory paradigm by highlighting the Court's
failure to recognize the positive contribution state tort lawsuits
make to a federal regulatory regime.'7 7 Other critics argue that
the Court's decisions amount to hidden tort reform and similarly
embrace the regulatory paradigm by raising utilitarian arguments in favor of tort lawsuits-e.g., that preemption shifts costs
from wrongdoers to taxpayers.1 71 Accordingly, the Court's use of
the regulatory paradigm in preemption cases has had a profound
impact on other actors.
But the rise of the regulatory paradigm is likely to exacerbate
existing problems within the Court's preemption doctrine as well.
That doctrine has always been criticized as easily subject to judi152, 130 S. Ct. 1068 (2010)) (arguing that tort lawsuits "promote[ ] the public interest by
incentivizing improved product design"); see also n. 157 and accompanying text (discussing
the argument of the petitioners in Williamson).
176. See e.g. In re Prempro Prods.Liab. Litig., 586 F.3d 547, 563 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding a state failure-to-warn claim not preempted, but stating that state law was a
complimentary form of regulation); Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1091,
1097 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (declaring a state law preempted and referring to state tort law as a
form of regulation); Mills v. Warner-Lambert Co., 581 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (E.D. Tex.
2008) (finding preemption and viewing state tort law as a form of regulation); Forst v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (rejecting preemption but equating state law as a compliment to federal regulations).
177. See e.g. Schapiro, supra n. 23, at 821 ("Dialogue facilitates regulatory innovation.
The optimal regulatory regime develops and changes over time, with constant interaction
from a variety of forces, including information generated by other regulators. State tort
suits may produce information of great value to federal regulators.").
178. See Amicus Curiae Br. of Const. & Admin. L. Scholars in Support of Respts., Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Good, 2008 WL 2489869 at **19-20 (No. 07-562, 128 S. Ct. 538
(2008)) (asserting preemption results shift accident costs from wrongdoers to taxpayers
and the general public); David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of
the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-WarnClaims, 96 Geo. L.J. 461, 480-481 (2008)
(contending that preemption reduces industry incentives to improve product safety); Funk
et al., supra n. 36, at 13 (arguing that tort lawsuits resist the problem of agency capture
because plaintiffs' attorneys have incentives to invest resources to "secure redress for
victims of industry misconduct"). To be sure, many of these scholars also clearly challenge
the regulatory paradigm by seeking to have tort law's alternative-redress function preserved, or at least considered, in preemption decisions. Grey, supra n. 39, at 613-619;
Schapiro, supra n. 23, at 820; Sharkey, supra n. 12, at 466-471; Funk et al., supra n. 36, at
10.
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cial manipulation or, at best, judicial inconsistency."' As Professor Thomas Merrill points out, the preemption doctrine is in large
part "substantively empty."so It "misdescribes what happens in
preemption cases ... attributing to Congress judgments that are
in fact grounded in judicial perceptions about the desirability of
displacing state law in any given area."'' The rise of the regulatory paradigm may exacerbate such manipulation. Although it is
unclear whether the regulatory/compensatory dichotomy normatively drove the Court's actions in most cases,'82 that dichotomy
provided some grounding for the Court. The characterization of
tort lawsuits as regulatory and compensatory was a useful
reminder to the Justices that tort lawsuits were not always
equivalent to positive enactments, and the paradigms provided
useful descriptive and rhetorical devices for opposing members of
the Court.'8 ' Thus, those ruling in favor of preemption and relying
on the regulatory paradigm were forced to deal with the compensatory, private law aspects of tort lawsuits when raised by the
dissenters.'8 4 Without a strong view of tort lawsuits as existing at
least partly for personal redress, courts have greater incentive to
read vague statutory terms, such as "requirement" or "law," to
encompass tort lawsuits although they do not clearly apply to
them.'
Furthermore, the rise of the regulatory paradigm may promote deference to agency regulators in situations in which it is
unwarranted. The role of agency regulators has gained primacy
along with the rise of the regulatory paradigm. As Professor Nina
Mendelson has noted, "federal administrative agencies increasingly seem to claim for themselves the authority to distribute
power between the federal government and the states."'8 6 The circumstances in which agency officials can preempt state law and
the appropriate level of deference due to their interpretations
179. See e.g. Sharkey, supra n. 12, at 458-459 (noting the amount of scholarly criticism
surrounding the Court's inconsistent approach to preemption).
180. Merrill, supra n. 35, at 742.
181. Id. at 741.
182. Sharkey, supra n. 12, at 459.
183. See supra nn. 111-121 and accompanying text (discussing the pervasive tension
between the regulatory and compensatory functions of tort actions in the Bates opinion).
184. Supra n. 96 and accompanying text.
185. See supra nn. 101-103 (providing examples of when the Court has equated vague
statutory terms to encompass preemption of tort lawsuits).
186. Mendelson, supra n. 45, at 698.
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pose difficult questions for courts in any type of preemption case.
Those issues are further complicated when agency regulators
claim the ability to preempt tort lawsuits in the face of congressional silence on that topic."' As interested parties, agency
officials may have reason to read otherwise vague statutory terms
as extending to lawsuits. By treating lawsuits as merely an
extension of the regulatory apparatus, the regulatory paradigm
gives agency officials great discretion to make such decisions,
thus extending the recent trend of deference to agency regulators
when it may be unwarranted."'
Furthermore, by characterizing preemption of tort lawsuits
primarily as a relationship between federal and state governments, the regulatory paradigm ignores the individuals originally
at the heart of the lawsuits-i.e., the plaintiffs. The regulatory
paradigm defines the stakes involved as those between the regulatory needs of federal officials versus the regulatory rights of
states as sovereigns."' Accordingly, other than to view plaintiffs
as possible catalysts for improving the federal system of regulation, the regulatory paradigm essentially ignores their
existence.so There is little sense that plaintiffs, individually or
collectively, deserve much consideration as part of the preemption
calculus. Surely, tort plaintiffs do not view themselves solely as
part of a regulatory system with no sense of individual identity or
purpose in bringing a lawsuit. In fact, plaintiffs often have a multitude of reasons for bringing lawsuits.19 ' Most of them are
personal to their specific situation, although some may overlap
with regulatory goals.192 Shunting them aside in the preemption
debate-without adequate consideration of the nature and pur187. See id. at 698-699 (noting the difficulties inherent in agency preemption, especially in the absence of an explicit directive from Congress).
188. Sharkey, supra n. 12, at 471-474 (noting a trend of Supreme Court deference to
agency determinations of preemption).
189. See id. at 471 (noting the Court's tendency to focus on state sovereignty concerns
even when discussing the compensation function of state tort law).
190. See supra nn. 127-129 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion
in Riegel, which rejected the compensatory paradigm, except as an aid to federal regulatory efforts).
191. See Funk et al., supra n. 36, at 13 (listing various reasons why plaintiffs bring suit
in preemption cases).
192. See e.g. Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to StructureAdvocacy in a NonadversarialSetting, 14 Ohio St.
J. on Dis. Res. 269, 302-306 (1999) (detailing several possible goals of parties that may
pose barriers to monetary settlements).
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poses of tort lawsuits-serves no useful purpose, creates antagonism, and further silences plaintiffs' voices.
V. CONCLUSION

None of this means that tort lawsuits are beyond preemption.
But equating the regulatory effect of tort lawsuits and statutory
or regulatory enactments elides important differences between
them. The Court would be better served to acknowledge those differences and adopt a preemption jurisprudence that explicitly
deals with them. The preemption defense has become a powerful
weapon in lawsuits involving products liability and negligence
claims. The Roberts Court is likely to hear future cases involving
these conflicts, and it should take the opportunity to clarify this
increasingly incoherent paradigm.
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